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This section of JARMAC includes a series of commentaries on articles published in the 
September, 2015, special issue of JARMAC: „Modeling and aiding intuition in organizational 
decision making” (Marewski & Hoffrage, 2015). The commentaries focus on research programs 
such as naturalistic decision making, heuristics-and-biases, ACT-R, and CLARION. They 
feature topics ranging from evolution to decision styles. In this introduction, we provide a brief 
overview of those contributions, alongside with concluding words on this project of pulling 
together multiple and very different strands on intuition.  
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Not too long ago, one of us stood, in the evening twilight, on top of a hill, letting his gaze 
wander across a valley. On the other side of the valley, the eye met distant trees, and then, all of 
a sudden, partly veiled by branches and wagering fog: a fallen column, remnants of an 
amphitheatre, and a small, round temple. These ruins were not built by ancient Rome’s 
architects, as one might suspect, but crafted during the Enlightenment. The ruins’ hidden, foggy 
romance contrasts with the aesthetics of a beautiful palace, built on the very same hill from 
which this scene unfolds. This palace is intact, characterized by ordered shapes, colonnades, and 
statues. It sits on top of that hill like a jewellery-braced crown, with majestic stairs reaching 
down and widening into an open park landscape – that of Sanssouci, Potsdam, Germany.  
The dialectics of these two poles – the ruins in the distance, dreamt-up re-creations of a 
once powerful empire, and the seemingly more modern palace with its intact golden lines, clear 
structure, and order on the hill – is akin to the contrast that forms the central theme of this special 
issue and its commentaries: The savage, almost ancestral mysticism of intuition, gut feelings, and 
subjective hunches on the one hand, and the majestic, enlightened garments of reason, 
rationality, and careful analysis on the other hand.  
1. What is intuition? 
The ideal of using rational, reasoned analysis to understand the world dates back, at least, 
to the Enlightenment. Nowadays, it continues to be strong in academia, business, medicine, and 
other areas of professional activity – together with the belief that subjective intuitions are 
something inferior, preferably avoided in serious scientific or other professional activities. Many 
authors juxtapose intuition to reason and embed both in long lists of associates, such as feelings 
and heuristic shortcuts on the one hand, and analysis and slow thinking on the other hand – just 
think of the title of Kahneman’s (2011) bestseller “Thinking, fast and slow”. The associates, in 




turn, are given different connotations, with those linked to intuition ranging from animalistic to 
fast but error-prone, and those linked to “reason” from optimal to rational. Yet, despite having 
some idea of what intuition is to them personally, many scientists seem to be at pains to specify 
precisely what it is, so that one single, commonly agreed-upon definition does not exist. Contrary 
to reason – which can be cast in terms of models of logic, careful information integration, or 
optimization – intuition remains, scientifically, an elusive notion. 
 Indeed, one striking observation we noted when putting together the special issue 
(Marewski & Hoffrage, 2015) and the present commentary section (Hoffrage, Marewski, & 
Fisher, 2016) is that there is little consensus in the literature as to what intuition is and how it 
ought to be studied. Different authors link intuition to diverse definitions and notions, including 
the unconscious, the opposite of reason, or heuristics. Moreover, studies of intuition use diverse 
methodologies, ranging from plain story-telling to experimental work and computer simulations. 
In this introduction, we will illustrate those different views on – and their corresponding 
methodological approaches to – intuition by providing a brief overview of the commentaries.  
2. Views on intuition 
 Intuition seen in different dimensions and domains. What is intuition? Various authors 
of the special issue focus on single – and different – aspects of intuition, such as unconscious 
decision-making (Chassot, Klöckner, & Wüstenhagen, 2015), holistic decision-making (Brown 
& Daus, 2015), or effortless decision-making (Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015). Others, in 
contrast, including ourselves (Hoffrage & Marewski, 2015), see multiple dimensions of intuition. 
Amit, Rusou, and Arieli (2016, THIS ISSUE) contrast those various uni-dimensional and multi-
dimensional conceptualizations of intuition and review research that tested whether there is an 
empirical basis to separate various dimensions of intuition.  




Independent of whether intuition is conceptualized as a uni-dimensional or multi-
dimensional concept, several interesting questions, both theoretical and applied, mark the field: 
When should one follow one’s intuition, and when should one adopt an analytical decision style? 
And what do people actually do? Do the answers to these prescriptive and descriptive questions 
depend on the domain? After all, when looking at ourselves, as researchers, we find that in most 
of our scientific work, we claim to stay on one pole:  Experiments, computer code, numbers, 
logic, and scientific reasoning. Yet, deeply inside we all know that for many – if not most – of 
our scientific insights our intuitions played an eminent role as well. And when it comes to 
romantic love, most would hasten to stress that they did not espouse their romantic partners 
solely based on analysis and without listening to their intuitions and feelings (Gigerenzer, 2014).  
Two of the articles in the special issue address the question whether and when people 
favor intuition over analysis. Specifically, Brown and Daus (2015) probed police officers’ 
behavior (more spontaneously and affect-laden vs. more deliberate and rational) in two different 
situations, and Pachur and Spaar (2015) asked students for their preferences to use intuition 
versus analysis in six different domains. Olds and Link (2016-THIS ISSUE) build on Pachur 
and Spaar’s findings, namely that people’s preferences for one or the other style are domain-
specific, and they discuss two possible sets of explanations for such domain-specific preferences: 
One can be found in objective characteristics of the domain itself (e.g., predictability of events; 
see also Shanteau, 2015), and the other one in individual differences (e.g., with respect to 
expertise).  
Szaszi (2016-THIS ISSUE) also expands upon Pachur and Spaar (2015), but raises a 
conceptual issue: Is people’s tendency to adopt an intuitive decision style the same as their 




preference for that style? Szaszi warns that these two concepts should not be used 
interchangeably.  
Intuition reflected in clashes and conflicts. Kurt Lewin (1952) once remarked, “There is 
nothing more practical than a good theory” (p. 169). Yet theory and practice do not always find 
each other, and sometimes, the two even conflict. Gore and Conway (2016-THIS ISSUE), 
discusses the contrast of intuition and analysis in the fuzzy and uncertain world of organizations, 
that is, in practice. Similar to Brown (2015), they call for a hybrid approach that combines 
intuition and analysis, and discuss (a) ways to build bridges between academia and practice and 
(b) how research in general and intuition research in particular can have greater impact on policy 
and practitioners.  
Frey, Neys, and Bago (2016-THIS ISSUE) also focus on conflict, albeit not on the 
conflict between theory and practice, but on conflicts between intuitive and analytic forms of 
thinking, most notably between scientific theories that conceive of such forms of thinking in 
different ways. For example, within the fast-and-frugal heuristics framework (e.g., Gigerenzer, 
Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Hafenbrädl, Wäger, Marewski, & Gigerenzer, in press) 
heuristic decision making processes – linked to intuition (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007, 2014) – are 
thought of underlying fast, but possibly also very smart and adaptive judgments and decisions. 
Similarly, research on naturalistic decision making (e.g., Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & 
Zsambok, 1993) stresses the clever nature of intuitive decision making processes. On the other 
hand, the heuristics-and-biases research program (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) 
and associated work on System-1/System-2 dichotomies highlighted the superiority of analytic, 
deliberate over intuitive, heuristic processes. In their commentary, Frey et al. focus on what 




happens when individuals detect that intuitive processes produce outcomes that violate 
normative standards (see also Dhami, Belton, & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015).  
Intuition cast into the language of mathematics and computer code. In the cognitive 
and decision sciences, a fundamental question is how people arrive at their judgments and how 
they make decisions in situations of risk or uncertainty. The language to describe those situations 
is that of mathematics: Variables or clues in the environment (e.g., a person’s reputation) 
correlate with unknown criteria (e.g., whether this person will cooperate in a given situation), 
and, by assessing those environmental cues, individuals can try to infer those criteria. This 
conceptualization of decision making environments in terms of formal language is also key to 
other approaches to judgment and decision making that have been featured in this special issue. 
Cases in point are White, Pothos, and Busemeyer’s (2015) quantum probability theory approach, 
judgment analysis in the Neo-Brunswikian tradition (Hammond, 2015), or, to a more limited 
extent, research within the heuristics-and-biases program, namely when equations are used to 
define what might be adequate solutions to a given decision problem (see Dickert, Västfjäll, 
Kleber, & Slovic, 2015). Yet, formal language does not only lend itself to model how judgments 
and decisions ought to be made and in what environmental context they are made, but also to 
model how people actually make them. In the special issue, examples of attempts to 
computationally model intuition are the cognitive model CLARION (Connectionist Learning with 
Adaptive Rule Induction ON-line; Sun, 2015) or the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Adaptive 
Control of Thought – Rational, Thomson, Lebiere, Anderson, & Staszewski, 2015; Juvina, 
Lebiere, & Gonzalez, 2015). In their commentary, Larue and Juvina (2016-THIS ISSUE) 
discuss further how ACT-R could be used to implement the tri-partitive framework of Stanovich 
(2009). According to this framework, the human mind can be decomposed functionally into an 




autonomous mind, an algorithmic mind, and a reflective mind. Larue and Juvina propose that the 
algorithmic mind, for instance, might be modeled in terms of ACT-R’s memory mechanisms 
with its underlying mathematical equations.  
In another commentary, Bear and Rand (2016-THIS ISSUE), in turn, invoke computer 
simulations as means towards building theories on the likely origins of intuition. Specifically, 
they demonstrate that formal models inspired by evolutionary game theory can help explain why 
intuitions might have evolved even though agents who process information more thoroughly 
outperfom “intuitive” agents.  
3. Conclusion  
How shall we model and aid intuition?  One answer that is commonly found in the 
judgment and decision making literature is: Understand the nature of experience!  A second 
alternative is Klein’s (2003) recognition-primed decision model (see also Klein, 2015; or 
Shanteau, 2015). Still others, at least when it comes to aiding, are “simulated experience” and 
story-telling (Hogarth & Soyer, 2015). Even more answers – some complimentary, other not – 
have been formulated in the 23 manuscripts published in the special issue and its commentary 
section (see entries with * and **, respectively, in the reference list below).  
Intuition, so we realized in the course of almost four years of editorial work, continues to 
be a beautiful, elusive subject of scientific inquiry that seems to shy away from the light of 
analysis and that behaves like an inkblot test or a chameleon – different people construe intuition 
in different ways (see also Raue et al., 2015). Indeed, when pulling the different contributions to 
this special issue together in our introductory article (Hoffrage & Marewski, 2015), we pointed 
out that intuition as a topic of scientific inquiry is very different from other topics. It not only 
calls for analytical and empirical methods of scientific inquiry, but also for insight and Gestalt. 




Much can be learned about intuition through scientific definitions, equations, computer 
simulations, or experiments. At the same time, much would also be missed if one relied 
exclusively on such approaches – which was, in many ways, a surprising insight for us as 
experimentally-working psychologists and/or computational modellers. Intuition comes as an 
inner feeling, as a messenger from our unconscious, as something undefinable, but yet 
illuminating and powerful. Gestalt-inducing media, such as pictures, poetry, or other artworks, 
can transport that insight and get across some flavour of intuition’s mystery. This flavour is, 
interestingly, not so distinct from the sentiments one can have when looking, during sunset, at 
the scenery described above, the ruin hill of Sanssouci: A breeze of romantic longing for 
something that is hidden and occult, yet, at the same time intimately related to us and our own 
origin. 
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